The Tamesis
January 13, 2026
Dhaka – As Bangladesh approaches its 13th parliamentary elections scheduled for February 12, the country is not just gearing up to elect a new government. It was also called upon to rebuild the nation itself. The authoritarian system that was overthrown by a massive uprising in 2024 did not collapse simply because of the illegitimacy of its elections; Its decline is due to the concentration of power, the capture of institutions, the disappearance of accountability, and the systematic dismantling of democratic norms.
If the upcoming election is seen as the end in itself, then history is likely to repeat itself. However, if it becomes the gateway to a truly reset and lasting democratic transition, the country may finally escape the cycle of authoritarian relapse. I believe that achieving this requires adhering to at least three basic rules or principles of governance, drawn from global experience as well as Bangladesh’s own painful lessons.
Reset parliamentary and bureaucratic functions
The first rule is that the elected executive (members of parliament) will have complete control over policy development, while the permanent executive (bureaucrats) will be responsible for implementation – both functioning within their respective areas of competence. However, this distinction is rarely respected in Bangladesh. Under the constitution, ministers are responsible for laws and policies, but real power often lies in the hands of an entrenched bureaucracy that sets policy, controls implementation and operates with limited accountability.
This is no accident. The bureaucracy in Bangladesh is a direct descendant of the British colonial state in India and was designed to generate revenue and control its subjects rather than serve its citizens. Independence did not abolish this extractive system; it merely transferred it. Over time, bureaucratic discretion becomes a source of power and rents, while democratic oversight is eroded, creating a vast ecosystem of resource allocation involving corrupt or compromised politicians, bureaucracies, judiciaries, and businesses under failed regimes.
The consequences of this erosion are vast and multifaceted. Bangladesh’s tax-to-GDP ratio hovers around 6% to 7%, one of the lowest in the world. Public investment is subject not only to fiscal constraints but also to bureaucratic gatekeeping and delays. Implementation of the annual development plan has repeatedly fallen behind schedule, with cost overruns reflecting ongoing administrative failures. A survey by the Administrative Reform Commission early last year found that 66 per cent thought civil servants behaved like “rulers”, while an overwhelming 80 per cent thought they were unfriendly to the public – a perception that has remained more or less unchanged.
Global experience contrasts sharply here. In addition to pre-World War II democracies, countries such as South Korea and Indonesia have restored democratic governance through the professionalization of civil servants while reasserting political control over policy. Singapore’s merit-based bureaucracy is protected by constitutional guarantees, illustrating how avoiding partisan capture can coexist with strong accountability. By contrast, Pakistan’s repeated governance failures illustrate the costs of politicized government.
Bangladesh can draw the line between parliament and bureaucracy through law and practice: clear demarcation of roles, independent oversight of the civil service, and tight parliamentary control over policy direction. Elected officials must lead policy development, while bureaucrats must execute it professionally, neutrally, and transparently. A concrete remedy for this would be to enact a constitutional services law that would legally divide functions, protect the bureaucracy from partisan rotation, and establish independent oversight bodies.
Activate the judicial level to ensure judicial fairness
The second rule calls for the establishment of a fully functional judicial pyramid to end the tyranny of delaying or denying access to justice. Over the years, the systematic politicization and under-resourcing of lower courts has undermined public trust, often forcing citizens to bypass them and sometimes resort to extralegal means out of frustration.
As of June 30, 2025, the number of pending cases in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court was 37,002, while the burden on the High Court Division increased to 616,000 cases. Meanwhile, the total number of pending cases at all levels of the judiciary stood at 4.652 million. The overburdened Supreme Court dealing with so many pending cases is a stark warning of what happens when the justice system breaks down. No legal system can work this way. Justice must be done at the appropriate level, not always rising to the top.
Here, we must acknowledge the key judicial reforms introduced in recent months, including the creation of the Supreme Court Secretariat to preserve and streamline judicial powers, and the transfer of control over the promotion, appointment and transfer of lower court judges from the Ministry of Law to the Supreme Court. Civil and criminal courts are separate at the district level. There will also be permanent High Court Judges in each division. One of the aims of these measures is to streamline judicial functions and reduce the backlog of cases. They also reflect the urgency of activating the judicial pyramid. Because without a functioning lower judiciary, constitutional government itself becomes fragile and selective. The challenge now is to ensure that these and other recommended reforms are implemented correctly.
Limit political competition to parliament
The third fundamental rule is to place the Jatiya Sangsad at the center of democratic politics by embedding meaningful opposition in the constitution. Democracy works through organized disagreement and constant scrutiny.
Bangladesh’s recent parliamentary history reveals a dangerous pattern: After deeply flawed elections, parliament becomes a de facto one-party system, with little debate and minimal legislative amendments. Between 2008 and 2024, less than 1% of bills were substantively revised due to opposition opinions. Unsurprisingly, opposition politics moved from the House of Representatives to the streets.
Street politics is not a cultural necessity but an institutional failure. When the opposition is deprived of its seats in parliament, it seeks relevance and remedies elsewhere. Harassment, blockades, confrontations and disruptions impose heavy economic and social costs, especially for informal workers and the poor.
The true test of a democracy is its ability to institutionalize opposition. In mature democracies, opposition is formalized through mechanisms such as “shadow cabinets,” senior members, and guaranteed “opposition days.” For Bangladesh, the priority is clear: constitutionalize the opposition. This means not only giving opposition leaders legal status and resources in parliament, but also the legislative opposition chairing key oversight committees, guaranteeing parliamentary time to deal with opposition matters, and creating a social contract that establishes parliament as the exclusive and effective arena for any political struggle and disagreement.
Massive uprisings in 2024 call not only for a change of rulers but also for the institutionalization of rules-based governance. The dysfunctions of the deposed regime – the politicization of the bureaucracy, the paralysis of the judiciary and the hollowing out of parliament – must not be repeated under a new mandate.
Citizens expect elected leaders to govern properly, a professional bureaucracy to enforce the law, a judicial system to be active and to adjudicate appropriately, and parliamentary opposition to be empowered and subject to appropriate scrutiny. This architecture is crucial to transforming the hopes of the uprising into the lasting and legitimate democracy that the people of Bangladesh rightly demand.
Dr. Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir is Professor at the Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
